Hyakinton Daisai
Federalist PapersThe Comitia Centuriata was one of two distinct Roman legislative bodies used to illustrate how rival political interests could coexist within a republic. Its organization by centuries gave the patrician interest an advantage; alongside the Comitia Tributa, where numbers favored the plebeian interest, it demonstrates that institutional division need not make shared authority impossible.
Structure and Political Character
In the Roman example, citizens voted by centuries in the Comitia Centuriata, a design that gave the patrician interest superiority. The contrasting Comitia Tributa was arranged so that numbers prevailed and the plebeian interest held entire predominance. The bodies were not presented as branches of a single legislature but as distinct and independent legislatures, each shaped by an opposing political interest.
Coexistence and Legislative Authority
Each body could annul or repeal the acts of the other. That apparent contradiction might have supported arguments that two such authorities were unfit to coexist; yet the author treats their long survival as an established fact, not a theoretical possibility. The assemblies coexisted for ages, and the Roman republic nevertheless attained what the text calls the utmost height of human greatness.
Use as a Constitutional Analogy
The example supports an argument about concurrent authority: abstract claims that two bodies with potentially conflicting powers cannot exist together cannot disprove an arrangement whose existence is demonstrated by historical experience. The comparison is bounded, however. In the proposed American system under discussion, neither the federal government nor the states could annul the other's acts, unlike the Roman assemblies described here. The Roman case therefore establishes the possibility of institutional coexistence, while the text distinguishes the American arrangement by its different allocation of authority.